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D
ecades of evidence from individual-choice experiments have documented that 
subjects do not always satisfy the assumptions of consumer theory and of 
expected utility theory. Some departures from the standard model can be accom-
modated while maintaining the assumption that people do have stable preferences. 
Experiments on anchoring effects are more troubling as they suggest that many 
people do not have fixed or slowly changing preferences. A defender of the standard 
models might argue that this is not relevant to most everyday consumer decisions, 
and that an average person with enough experience will have relatively fixed prefer-
ences for common market goods. This suggests that experience with the goods and 
decisions in question may be important in the stability of preferences. Since people 
are relatively familiar with risky monetary choices, this in turn suggests that deci-
sions about uncertain prospects (lotteries) might be relatively stable.
If the monetary valuation of goods and gambles is based on constant underlying 
preferences, choices should be independent of irrelevant prior “anchoring” ques-
tions. In the case of lotteries, Johnson and Schkade (1989) showed that asking sub-
jects whether they would prefer a fixed amount (the anchor) to a given gamble 
affected subsequently stated certainty equivalents. Chapman and Johnson (1999) 
had subjects generate a random anchor from their Social Security Number (SSN), 
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and found very strong anchoring effects on the stated willingness to accept (WTA) 
for selling a purely hypothetical lottery.
In the case of goods, Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec (2003, henceforth ALP) used 
a simple anchoring manipulation to provide evidence that people do not have constant 
preferences. They first generated a personal random number between 0 and 99 for 
each subject (the anchor), asking them to turn the last two digits of their SSN into a 
dollar price. They then asked subjects whether they would buy particular consumer 
goods for this price. Subsequently, they elicited subjects’ willingness to pay (WTP) 
for the goods using the Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964, henceforth BDM) 
mechanism,
1 and found that WTP was significantly correlated with the anchors.
These results seem troubling for economic theory. First, they are large. ALP 
write: “The effect is even more striking when examining the valuations by quin-
tiles of the social security number distribution […] the valuations of the top quintile 
subjects were typically greater by a factor of three. For example, subjects with SSN 
in the top quintile were willing to pay $56 on average for a cordless computer key-
board, compared with $16 on average for subjects with bottom quintile numbers. 
Evidently, these subjects did not have, or were unable to retrieve personal values for 
ordinary products.” Similarly, the average stated WTP for a bottle of average wine, 
for subjects whose SSN-based anchor price was in the highest quintile, was $27.90, 
more than three times as high as the analogous average WTP for subjects, whose 
SSN-based anchor price was in the lowest quintile. Moreover, ALP present evidence 
that their results are robust across many dimensions: repetition, different levels of 
simplicity of the “hedonic experience” (consuming a good is one such experience), 
different subject pools, different levels of monetary incentives, and markets versus 
individual choice. We believe that the ALP experiments are important and influen-
tial enough that they deserve to be replicated and tested for robustness.
We conducted four sets of experiments in order to examine whether preferences 
for common market goods and for simple lotteries are “arbitrary” in the sense of 
ALP. We examined choices for both lotteries and goods. In the case of goods we 
examined WTP and WTA and whether or not explaining the incentive properties 
of the BDM procedure matters. For lotteries we focused on eliciting WTA with the 
BDM incentives explained. These experiments enable us to examine new questions 
as well as examining robustness: Are preferences for lotteries or common goods 
more arbitrary? Are anchoring effects more pronounced for WTA or WTP?
Our first finding is that we are unable to replicate the results of ALP: we find very 
weak anchoring effects both with WTP and with WTA. The Pearson correlation 
coefficients between the anchor and stated valuation are generally much lower than 
in ALP, and the magnitudes of the anchoring effects (as measured by the ratio of top 
to bottom quintile) are smaller. Repeating the ALP procedure for lotteries we do not 
find any anchoring effects at all.
Unlike ALP, we carried out laboratory rather than classroom experiments. This 
necessitated some minor changes—discussed below—from ALP’s procedures. It is 
1 This mechanism is incentive compatible under risk neutrality, but not in general. However, there is strong 
evidence that experimental subjects are not risk neutral even for small gambles.VoL. 4 no. 2  133 FudEnBErg ET AL.: on ThE roBusTnEss oF Anchoring EFFEcTs
conceivable that these changes are responsible for the differences in our findings; if 
so the robustness of their results is limited.
I.  Experiment 1: Eliciting WTA for Common Market Goods
All of our experiments were paper-and-pencil as was the case in ALP. Our first 
experiment reexamined the effects of random anchors on subjects’ valuation for 
common market goods. The experiment took place in the California Social Science 
Laboratory (CASSEL) at UCLA, in August of 2009, and subjects were UCLA stu-
dents. Subjects were recruited using the standard procedure of the lab, which is 
sending an announcement to a large e-mail list. A total of 84 subjects participated,
2 
and each of the three sessions had 26–28 subjects.
Our subject pool consisted almost exclusively of undergraduate students, and the 
goods were chosen to be of interest for them: an academic planner, a cordless key-
board, a financial calculator, a designer book, a pack of quality chocolates, and a 
cordless mouse.
3 The average retail price of the goods was $51.70. When the experi-
ment started, subjects were asked to press the “Enter” key and generate a random 
number between 0 and 99 (we used the computer program Excel). Subjects were 
then asked to copy this number six times in their answer sheet. After subjects had 
done so, we started reading the instructions loudly, so that everyone could hear.
For each good, subjects had to answer two questions. The first (anchor) ques-
tion asked them whether they would be willing to sell the good for an amount of 
money equal to the number that they had written down. In the second question, 
subjects were asked to state the minimum price for which they would be will-
ing to sell the good. They were instructed to act as if the good was theirs to keep 
since there was a positive probability that they would truly own it. We explained 
that three subjects would be randomly drawn. Each of the three chosen persons 
would be assigned one of the goods (a different good for each of the three sub-
jects drawn). For each of them, one of her answers (corresponding to her assigned 
good) would be carried out for real.
4
If a subject was the first person randomly drawn, her answer to the first ques-
tion would be consequential. So if she stated that she wanted to sell the good for 
an amount equal to her random anchor she did so. Otherwise she kept the good and 
received it at the end of the experiment. If a subject was the person randomly drawn 
2 Although 84 subjects participated, five subjects were excluded from the data analysis. One subject failed to 
write a WTA for any of the goods, and another subject failed to write a WTA for one of the six goods. One subject 
failed to write the same anchor number for the six goods. One subject wrote a random number equal to $100, which 
was not in the range of possible random numbers (0–99). Finally, one subject failed to answer any of the anchoring 
questions (the first question for each of the goods), leaving the space blank. It is worth emphasizing that we have 
not excluded a subject whose WTA for the chocolates and the cordless mouse was $100 and $300, respectively, 
because it is not a priori impossible for someone to have such WTA for these common goods. So our actual sample 
size consists of 79 subjects.
3 Our principal objective was to replicate the ALP experiments in a laboratory. Economic laboratories, which 
work with large sample pools, typically use undergraduate students as subjects. This constrained the range of goods 
that we could use (for example, in the USA, wine cannot be procured to people below 21 years of age). In addi-
tion, changes had to be made due to the elapsed time from the ALP experiment (cordless trackballs were largely 
unknown to undergraduate students at the time of our experiment). We recognize that using different goods adds an 
additional confounding factor, but note that some of our goods were very similar to ALP.
4 This process emulates the procedures of ALP.134  AMEricAn EconoMic JournAL: MicroEconoMics  MAy 2012
second or third, her answer to the second question (for the assigned good) would 
matter. We explained that in this case, a price would be randomly drawn from a 
matrix containing 100 values. The values of the matrix were drawn before the exper-
iment from a triangular distribution in [0, 100] with a mode equal to zero. Subjects 
were shown the matrix on the screen. If the stated WTA was higher than the random 
price, the subject kept the good, and if not, she received a monetary amount equal to 
the random price, and sold the good. We also explained why the BDM mechanism 
gives an incentive to truthfully reveal preferences.
5
We explained that all uncertainty would be resolved using physical devices. The 
random price would be chosen from the 100 possible prices by throwing a ten-sided 
dice twice. The three consequential goods would be determined by throwing a six-
sided dice three times. The three chosen subjects would be chosen using a bingo 
cage with balls numbered according to numbers pre-assigned to the subjects.
After we had finished explaining the instructions, we showed the six goods to 
subjects. We displayed each good in clear view, and a photograph of each good 
was also projected on a screen. After showing each good we gave subjects time to 
complete the answers to both questions. After they finished, they were asked to copy 
their responses to a second answer sheet. After we picked up the second answer 
sheet, we resolved all uncertainty as explained, and concluded the experiment.
Given the results of ALP, our prior expectation was that we would find a positive 
relationship between the personal random number and the stated valuation. Thus in 
all our experiments, we use one-tailed statistical tests. For example, we reject the 
null hypothesis of a zero Pearson correlation between the personal random number 
and the WTA at a certain significance level if we get a high enough positive value of 
the sample correlation.
The average cash payment per subject was $13.80. Moreover, subjects received 
goods of total retail value equal to $298.00, which implies that the average value of 
earned goods per subject was about $3.50.
6
Table 1 presents the main results. For each of the five quintiles of the distribu-
tion of the personal random number, we report the mean and the median WTA (the 
medians are in the parentheses). We also report the Pearson correlation coefficients, 
both to understand whether there is a linear relationship between the WTA and the 
anchor and in order to allow comparisons with ALP. As seen in the table, the Pearson 
correlation coefficients between the random anchor and stated WTA were relatively 
5 Prelec explained the BDM procedure as part of his class prior to conducting the experiment. As we used paid 
participants from a laboratory pool, we instead explained the procedure as part of the experiment. We based our 
explanation on the instructions of Plott and Zeiler (2005). In particular, we said: “Please, leave your instructions 
aside for a while. With the second question, we want to know how much the opportunity to have each item is worth 
to you. This method simply gives you an incentive to state the true minimum you would be willing to accept for 
selling each item. Why is your best strategy to write the minimum you would be willing to accept? Because you 
will not receive the amount you ask for. Instead, if you receive anything, you will receive the random price. Let’s try 
to understand this with an example. Imagine that I own the item. Say I believe that this item is worth $500 for me. 
What happens if I falsely say that the minimum I would be willing to accept is more than 500? Assume I say $600. 
If the random price is, say, 530, I do not sell the item. But, had I said 500, I could receive 530 for an item that I think 
is only worth 500. I lose out. What happens if I say less than 500? For example, I say only 400. If the random price 
is, say, 420, then I have to sell my item. I lose out, because I have to sell for 420 an item that I think is worth 500.” 
Note that these instructions implicitly tell subjects to be risk neutral.
6 Each of the participants who were not chosen received a participation fee of $13. Chosen persons also received 
this fee, in addition to being assigned one good.VoL. 4 no. 2  135 FudEnBErg ET AL.: on ThE roBusTnEss oF Anchoring EFFEcTs
small: they range from −0.108 to 0.207, and only one of them is statistically signifi-
cant. We also report the (non-parametric) Spearman correlation coefficient and find 
similar values. In contrast, the Pearson correlation coefficients in ALP’s study range 
from 0.319 to 0.516 and are all highly statistically significant, despite their smaller 
sample size.
7
To get further evidence for the importance of anchoring, we examine the ratio 
of stated WTA for subjects in the highest quintile of random numbers to those in 
the lowest quintile. Recall that ALP report ratios of about 2.3 and 2.2 for two of the 
goods, and between 3 and 3.45 for the remaining four goods. Table 2 reports our 
results. For one of our goods the ratio was 2.9, for the other five the ratio ranged 
from 1.1 to 1.4. Using the (nonparametric) Wilcoxon rank-sum test we are unable to 
reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity at the 5 percent significance level for the 
five goods with ratios between 1.1 and 1.4. For the remaining good (the financial 
calculator) the hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent significance level. Notice that 
if we test six different true hypotheses with different data it is not unlikely that one 
of them will be rejected at the 5 percent level. On the other hand all the ratios are 
greater than 1, which is not likely if there is no anchoring at all.
8
II.  Experiment 2: Willingness to Pay
Our second experiment examines whether the differences of our results in 
Experiment 1 from ALP’s were driven by the fact that we elicited WTA and ALP 
elicited WTP. This treatment also took place at the CASSEL lab at UCLA, in April 
of 2010, and the participants were UCLA students. A total of 79 subjects partici-
pated, in three sessions of 26 or 27 students.
9 The average payment per subject was 
equal to $21.8.
10
7 The sample of ALP consisted of 55 subjects, whereas we had 79 subjects.
8 The statistical tests reported in the main text included all of our data; in Appendix 1 we verify that our con-
clusions about which effects are significant do not change if we exclude outliers and subjects with inconsistent 
responses, as has been done in some past work on this topic.
9 One subject failed to answer any of the six anchoring questions and was excluded for the analysis. Hence, our 
final dataset consists of 78 subjects.
10 The subjects who were not chosen received a participation fee of $13.
Table 1—Experiment 1, Average and Median WTA Sorted by  
Quintile of the Distribution of the Anchor
Quintile 
(# obs.)
Academic 
planner
Cordless 
keyboard
Financial 
calculator
Designer
book
Milk
chocolates
Cordless
mouse
0–19 (13)   7.00   (5)  38.85 (35)  10.23 (10)  11.30 (10)  5.62 (4)  22.07 (25)
20–39 (16)  12.44 (10)  50.19  (47.5)  20.37 (20)  14.75 (15)  17.88  (7)  42.88 (23)
40–59 (16)  11.50 (10)  51.94 (50)  20.94  (15.5)  18.12  (17.5)  8.47  (5.25)  24.56 (20)
60–79 (20)  10.05  (8)  38.00 (30)  18.78 (11)  16.50  (13.5)  7.47 (5)  19.95 (15)
80–99 (14)  7.64  (7.5)  47.28 (30)  31.92  (23.5)  15.57 (15)  7.36  (6.5)  26.85 (20)
All data  9.90 (9)  45.07 (40)  20.46 (15)  15.46 (15)  9.46 (6)  27.10 (20)
Pearson    −0.047   −0.022  0.207  0.134   −0.096   −0.108
p-value  0.66  0.58  0.03  0.12  0.80  0.83
Spearman    −0.046   −0.059  0.208  0.126  0.070   −0.133
p-value  0.66  0.70  0.03  0.13  0.27  0.73136  AMEricAn EconoMic JournAL: MicroEconoMics  MAy 2012
The sessions were nearly identical to those of Experiment 1. The main differ-
ence was that subjects were asked to state the most they would be willing to pay for 
the goods.
11 Hence, the subjects that would be chosen at random would not own 
the good, but they would have the chance to buy it. To conform to the standards 
of the CASSEL lab, a large participation fee ($93) was offered to the three chosen 
subjects to make sure they could buy each good, and in order to prevent subjects 
from losing money in the experiment.
The results are shown in Table 3. We again examine the ratio of stated WTP for 
subjects in the highest quintile of random numbers to that of subjects in the lowest 
quintile. One ratio is quite large, 1.4. Four are less than one and lie between 0.9 
and 1.0, and the sixth, the financial calculator, has a very low ratio of 0.7, while in 
Experiment 1 it had a high ratio. However none of the ratios are statistically signifi-
cant at the 5 percent level according to the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. Moreover the 
Pearson and the Spearman correlations are all very close to zero.
12
From this data, we can conclude that anchoring effects are not stronger for WTP 
than WTA. Our data is consistent with the possibilities that anchoring effects are 
weaker for WTP than WTA and that there are negative anchoring effects, but we 
cannot make definitive statements about these issues.
III.  Experiment 3: Is it the BDM Explanations?
In Experiments 1 and 2 (as well as in experiment 4) we included part of the 
explanations of the BDM mechanism that was used by Plott and Zeiler (2005); our 
objective was to try to account for the explanations that were provided as a part of 
a classroom lecture before the experiments of ALP. As we could not replicate their 
classroom training it is possible that this is why our results differ from theirs. To 
examine the importance of the explanation of the BDM elicitation procedure our 
third experiment provides no explanations of the concept of WTP/WTA or of the 
BDM mechanism.
The experiment was also conducted at the CASSEL laboratory at UCLA, in 
February of 2011, and all subjects were UCLA students. A total of 81 subjects 
11 Four of the six goods were the same as in Experiment 1, while two goods were not the same, but very similar. 
A class organizer was used instead of an academic planner, and a very similar cordless mouse was used instead of 
the one used in Experiment 1.
12 As have earlier researchers, we find a possible WTP-WTA gap, however it is a relatively small one, in the 
order of 20–30 percent.
Table 2—Experiment 1, Wilcoxon Test of Homogeneity of the Distributions of WTA for  
Subjects in the First and Fifth Quintile of the Distribution of the Anchor
Item
Academic 
planner
Cordless 
keyboard
Financial 
calculator
Designer 
book
Milk 
chocolates
Cordless 
mouse
z −0.587 −0.685 −3.008 −1.424 −1.342 −0.171
p-value 0.279 0.247 0.001 0.077 0.090 0.423VoL. 4 no. 2  137 FudEnBErg ET AL.: on ThE roBusTnEss oF Anchoring EFFEcTs
participated in three sessions of 27 subjects each.
13 Subjects’ average cash payment 
was equal to $15.64, and in addition subjects received goods of total value equal to 
$153, for an average value of earned goods per subject of about $1.88.
14
The experiment was conducted in exactly the same way as Experiment 1, except 
without the additional explanations of the BDM mechanism.
15 The type and quality 
of each good was the same as in Experiment 1, except for using a telephone address 
book instead of an academic planner.
The results, shown in Table 5, are similar to our other two experiments. We again 
examine the ratio of stated WTA for subjects in the highest quintile of random num-
bers to the stated WTA of those in the lowest quintile. One of these is 1.5 (this 
time the cordless mouse rather than the financial calculator). Four lie between 1.0 
and 1.1, and the sixth is 1.2. Needless to say the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, shown 
in Table 6, are not significant. The Pearson correlation coefficients are very low 
although for one good the null hypothesis of a zero correlation is rejected at the 
5 percent significance level.
13 One subject failed to state a WTA for one of the goods, and another failed to copy the correct random number 
(wrote different numbers rather than a single one). These subjects were excluded from the observations, leaving a 
total of 79 subjects.
14 Each of the participants who were not chosen received a participation fee of $13. Chosen persons also 
received this fee, in addition to being assigned one good.
15 The written instructions were short. Appendix 2 contains the instructions for the lotteries experiment, which 
are similar to the written instructions used in the other three experiments.
Table 4—Experiment 2, Wilcoxon Test of Homogeneity of the Distributions of WTA  
for Subjects in the First and Fifth Quintile of the Distribution of the Anchor
Item
Class 
organizer
Cordless 
keyboard
Milk 
chocolates 
Cordless 
mouse
Designer 
book
Financial 
calculator
z 0.148 −0.191 0.562 0.959 0.500 1.024
p-value 0.558  0.424 0.713 0.831 0.691 0.847
Table 3—Experiment 2, Average and Median WTA Sorted by  
Quintile of the Distribution of the Anchor
Quintile 
(# obs.)
Class 
organizer
Cordless 
keyboard
Milk 
chocolates
Cordless 
mouse
Designer 
book
Financial 
calculator
0–19 (20)  3.25  (1)  30.70  (21)  4.82  (4)  16.75  (14.5)  7.70  (4.5)  15.05  (11.5)
20–39 (11)  2.95  (2)  33.45  (30)  4.77  (4)  15.63  (10)  5.55  (4)  12.09  (10)
40–59 (12)  4.00  (2)  32.33  (35)  4.83  (5)  17.58  (15)  8.91  (5)  7.66  (6)
60–79 (19)  4.37  (3)  33.37  (25)  5.00  (5)  16.95  (20)  8.32  (4)  13.74  (10)
80–99 (16)  4.81  (1)  28.31  (25.5)  4.19  (3)  12.87  (10)  6.25  (3)  9.81  (6)
All data  3.92  (1.5)  31.50  (25)  4.73  (4)  15.97  (15)  7.43  (4.5)  12.10  (8.5)
Pearson   −0.047  -0.022  −0.043  −0.039  −0.013  −0.080
p-value  0.66  0.58  0.65  0.63  0.54  0.76
Spearman   −0.046  −0.059  −0.007   −0.029  −0.013  −0.074
p-value  0.66  0.70  0.52  0.60  0.55  0.74138  AMEricAn EconoMic JournAL: MicroEconoMics  MAy 2012
IV.  Experiment 4: Eliciting WTA for Lotteries
In our fourth experiment, we elicited WTA for six money lotteries with a range of 
expected values similar (but not identical) to the range of the market prices of the six 
goods. The experiment also took place in the CASSEL lab at UCLA during November 
of 2008 and August of 2009. A total of 110 subjects participated,
16 in four sessions 
of 26–28 subjects each. Subjects were UCLA students, and the great majority was 
undergraduate students. The average total earnings per subject were equal to $21.7.
17
The six gambles are shown in Table 7. The procedures and the instructions were 
similar to Experiment 1, with lotteries instead of goods.
18 In each experimental session, 
16 We exclude from the data a person who did not state a WTA for one of the lotteries. We also exclude a partici-
pant who stated a WTA equal to $300 for the first lottery, and a WTA $400 for the sixth lottery. Since the maximum 
prize of any lottery is $100, we felt that it is impossible that someone could actually have such a WTA for the lot-
teries. Therefore, our final sample size is 108.
17 All subjects received a participation fee of $16. The three subjects who were randomly chosen to receive a 
lottery could earn money on top of that. The average market value of our experimental goods in Experiments 1 and 
3 was about $52, and the large “extra fee” of the chosen subjects in Experiment 2 was equal to $80. The average 
expected value for the lotteries was about $38. We used a somewhat higher participation fee in the lottery sessions 
in order to roughly equalize the ex-ante average expected payoffs for the lotteries and common goods treatments.
18 The only difference was that in this experiment we further explained to subjects how they should answer the 
questions. In particular, after presenting the two questions, we drew attention away from the written instructions, 
and told subjects: “Please go back to the last two pages of your instructions but please do not write anything yet. 
Please have a look at the lotteries and the questions you are asked to answer. The first question for each lottery is 
easy: do you prefer to have the opportunity to play this lottery or the specified amount of money? An example will 
illustrate what you should answer to the second question. Imagine that I own the right to play a particular lottery. 
Say this sample lottery ticket. How do I know what amount is the minimum I’d be willing to accept for the lottery? 
First of all, notice that, if I keep it, this lottery ticket gives me the opportunity to earn some money with a certain 
probability. I am not willing to give it up without getting some money. The question is, what is the minimum I would 
accept? Start with $100. Would I be willing to give up my lottery in exchange for 100? If so, decrease the amount   
Table 5—Experiment 3, Average and Median WTA  
Sorted by Quintile of the Distribution of the Anchor
Quintile 
(# obs.)
Address 
book
Cordless 
keyboard
Financial 
calculator
Designer 
book
Milk 
chocolates
Cordless 
mouse
0–19 (16) 8.31 (7.5) 39.69 (35) 20.81 (18.5) 14.31 (15) 7.28 (6.5) 19.93 (20)
20–39 (15) 10.06 (8.95) 31.60 (26) 21.40 (20) 17.13 (10) 5.93 (5) 17.26 (17)
40–59 (15) 12.60 (10) 42.53 (40) 17.80 (18) 20.20 (20) 11.13 (6) 25.46 (20)
60–79 (20) 6.55 (5) 41.05 (40) 21.80 (15.5) 17.35 (15) 5.10 (5) 20.85 (19)
80–99 (13) 10.38 (10) 41.62 (40) 21.69 (20) 16.30 (15) 7.69 (6) 29.30 (25)
All data 9.35 (8) 39.35 (35) 20.74 (18) 17.06 (15) 7.27 (6) 22.25 (20)
Pearson  0.001 0.097 0.022 0.041 0.003 0.202
p-value 0.50 0.20 0.42 0.36 0.49 0.04
Spearman  −0.013 0.123 0.017 0.012 −0.042 0.152
p-value 0.54 0.14 0.44 0.46 0.64 0.09
Table 6—Experiment 3, Wilcoxon Test of Homogeneity of the Distributions of WTA  
for Subjects in the First and Fifth Quintile of the Distribution of the Anchor
Item
Address 
book
Cordless 
keyboard
Financial 
calculator 
Designer 
book
Milk 
chocolates
Cordless 
mouse
z −0.904 −0.529 −0.507 −0.199 −0.309 −1.323
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three subjects would be drawn at random; each would get to own one lottery for real, 
and would either keep it or sell it depending on the answers given to the experimental 
questions. The lottery was carried out for real, using a dice. A subject who chose to 
keep the lottery, by indicating a WTA higher than the random price, would receive the 
prize drawn from the lottery. Otherwise, he or she simply received the random price 
from selling the lottery. All of this was made common knowledge to subjects.
We again examine the ratio of stated WTA for subjects in the highest quintile of 
random numbers to those in the lowest quintile. Three of the ratios lie between 0.99 
and 1.05, and the remaining three lie between 1.2. and 1.4. This is smaller even than 
the modest effect we found for goods. Despite the larger sample size none of the 
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests reported in Table 8 are significant at the 5 percent level. 
Nor are any of the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients in Table 7.
The lack of anchoring in our experiment might be due to the simplicity of the lot-
teries we considered. Chapman and Johnson (1999) used an SSN-based anchor, but 
for the complicated binary lottery ($287, 17 percent; $18.5, 83 percent), and found 
a Pearson correlation coefficient equal to 0.45, whereas the largest coefficient that 
we find for any lottery is equal to 0.082.
V. Conclusion
There were several differences between our experimental design and ALP. They 
elicited subjects’ WTP for six common goods: Belgian chocolates, a wireless key-
board, a designer book, a bottle of rare wine, a bottle of cheap wine, and a cordless 
to 95. If I am willing to accept 95 in exchange for the lottery, then decrease further. I keep decreasing until I come to 
the amount that makes me indifferent between keeping the lottery and getting the money. Your objective is to think 
like this for all six lotteries. You should think carefully before answering these questions because these questions 
are not purely hypothetical. There is a chance you will actually own each lottery, and each of your decisions may be 
carried out for real money.” This part was also based on the instructions by Plott and Zeiler (2005).
We attempted to use the minimal set of instructions that made clear what the rules of the procedure were. Some 
elements of this are arbitrary: for example, we told subjects that they might start at 100 and consider lower amounts 
until they were indifferent. It is possible that different results might have obtained had they been told to start at zero 
and consider higher amounts. However, it is hard to see how this might impact on the framing effect of being told 
to record particular numbers in advance.
Table 7—Experiment 4, Average and Median WTA Sorted by Quintile  
of the Distribution of the Anchor
Quintile 
(# obs.)
0.5, $100; 
0.5, $0
0.25, $100; 
0.75, $0
0.1, $100; 
0.9, $0
0.75, $60; 
0.25, $20
0.5, $60; 
0.5, $20
0.9, $60; 
0.1, $20
0–19 (18)  42.11  (40) 24.67  (20) 14.67  (10) 41.11  (40) 34.39  (35) 49.39  (52)
20–39 (13)  49.69  (50) 26.62  (25) 15.77  (11) 44.69  (45) 37.00  (40) 48.69  (50)
40–59 (22)  51.54  (50) 31.82  (32.5) 23.55  (20) 46.05  (45) 37.86  (40) 55.32  (55)
60–79 (21)  41.67  (50) 22.19  (25) 10.23  (10) 39.67  (45) 34.67  (40) 49.52  (55)
80–99 (34)  50.02  (50) 31.45  (27) 21.15  (13.5) 43.15  (42.5) 34.18  (30) 51.38  (52.5)
All data  47.35  (50) 28.01  (25) 17.78  (10) 42.90  (45) 35.40  (39.5) 51.17  (55)
Pearson  0.057  0.082  0.071   −0.010   −0.076  0.032
p-value  0.28  0.20  0.23  0.54  0.78  0.37
Spearman  0.119  0.090  0.034   −0.026   −0.104  0.025
p-value  0.11  0.17  0.36  0.60  0.86  0.40140  AMEricAn EconoMic JournAL: MicroEconoMics  MAy 2012
trackball. They performed the experiment in a class with 55 MBA students, and 
decisions were consequential for only six subjects, drawn at random, one for each 
good. We conducted the experiments in a lab environment, and we changed some of 
the goods, because of technology changes and age restrictions. In three treatments 
we used part of the Plott and Zeiler (2005) explanation of the BDM mechanism, but 
a fourth treatment suggests that this deviation from ALP was not a key factor in the 
earlier results.
We also preferred not to use the SSN-based anchor, since during a pilot some 
subjects showed privacy concerns. This might be another possible reason for the dif-
ference in our results. There is evidence that subjects might not view such numbers 
as truly arbitrary. For example, one-third of participants in one of the experiments 
of Chapman and Johnson (1999) stated that they thought the SSN-based anchor 
number was informative. In another experiment, 57 percent said that they thought 
that the experimenter wanted the number to influence their judgment. Perhaps an 
SSN-based anchor is not seen as random, in the sense that the value of the SSN has 
been determined long ago.
19
Our results do not confirm the very strong anchoring effects found in ALP. They 
are more in agreement with the results of Simonson and Drolet (2004) and Alevy, 
Landry, and List (2011). Simonson and Drolet (2004) used the same SSN-based 
anchor as ALP, and found no anchoring effects on WTA, and moderate anchoring 
effects on WTP for four common consumer goods. Alevy, Landry, and List (2011) 
performed a field experiment, eliciting the WTP for peanuts and collectible sports 
cards, and they found no anchoring effects. Bergman et al. (2010) also used the 
design of ALP for six common goods, and found anchoring effects, but of smaller 
magnitude than in ALP.
Tufano (2010) and Maniadis, Tufano, and List (2011) also failed to confirm the 
robustness of the magnitude of the anchoring effects of ALP, using hedonic experi-
ences, rather than common goods. Tufano (2010) used the anchoring manipulation 
to increase the variance in subjects’ WTA for a bad-tasting liquid, but the manipula-
tion had no effect. Notice that this liquid offers a simple (negative) hedonic experi-
ence, like the “annoying sounds” used in Experiment 2 of ALP. Maniadis, Tufano, 
and List (2011) replicated Experiment 2 of ALP and found weaker (and nonsig-
nificant) anchoring effects. Overall our results suggest that anchoring is real—it is 
19 The final digits of the social security number are not random and are in fact correlated with personal char-
acteristics such as the region and time of year of birth (see, e.g., Acquisti and Gross 2009). It seems unlikely that 
this correlation leads to a correlation between final digits of social security numbers and bidding behavior, but at 
this point we cannot rule that out.
Table 8—Experiment 4, Wilcoxon Test of Homogeneity of the Distributions of WTA  
for Subjects in the First and Fifth Quintile of the Distribution of the Anchor
Lottery
0.5, $100; 
0.5, $0
0.25, $100; 
0.75, $0
0.1, $100; 
0.9, $0
0.75, $60; 
0.25, $20
0.5, $60; 
0.5, $20
0.9, $60; 
0.1, $20
z −1.577 −1.312 −1.125 −0.371 0.304 −0.485
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hard to reconcile otherwise the fact that in the WTA treatment with goods the ratios 
between highest and lowest quintile is always bigger than one—but that quantita-
tively the effect is small. Additionally our data supports the idea that anchoring goes 
away when bidding on objects with greater familiarity, such as lotteries. Our results 
do not suggest that anchoring is stronger with WTP than WTA—if anything the 
reverse is true.
Appendix 1: Robustness Check of our Results
We tried to follow the ALP experiment as much as possible, so we did not include 
a long practice process, or very detailed instructions. Nevertheless, as we explained 
above, there is reason to believe that the notions of WTA and WTP, as well as the 
BDM mechanism, are not very easy to understand. Accordingly, some participants 
in our experiment showed signs of bidding “strategically,” or otherwise showed 
signs that they have not fully understood the valuation task. Moreover, several sub-
jects had their second answers inconsistent with their response in the first question, 
for the same good or lottery.
In Experiment 1, one subject assigned the same WTA ($20) to all goods, and 
another stated implausibly similar WTA for each of the six goods (in a range from 
$22 to $30). We believe that this behavior indicates insufficient understanding, 
because it is highly implausible that the actual WTA for so different goods lies in 
such a narrow range. Another subject stated a WTA equal to $5 for goods 1–4 and 
equal to $100 and $300 for goods 5 and 6, respectively, which highly unlikely to 
express true valuation. Moreover, several subjects had “inconsistent” responses, in 
the sense explained above. Accordingly, we considered a total of 15 subjects to have 
“questionable responses.”
In Experiment 2, some subjects stated improbably low willingness to pay for all 
the goods (less than $10 for any of the goods). The tendency to behave strategi-
cally in a bargaining situation is a plausible reason. Moreover, one subject stated 
a WTP of $50 for the good with the lowest average WTP (the first good, the class 
organizer), and a WTP less than $10 for all the other goods. This might indicate 
confusion. There were also a few inconsistent subjects, and, in total, 11 subjects in 
Experiment 3 had “questionable responses.”
In Experiment 3, two subjects stated the same WTA for all goods, one subject 
only used two different WTAs for the six different goods (each of this subject’s 
WTA were either $20 or $5) and four subjects’ stated WTAs had an excessively nar-
row range of $10 or less. Several other subjects stated inconsistent responses, and a 
total of 18 observations were characterized as “questionable.”
In Experiment 4, one subject assigned the same WTA ($5) to all lotteries. Four 
subjects stated only two different WTAs for the six different lotteries (for example, 
either $97 or $30, either $10 or $56). Three subjects stated an implausibly similar 
WTA for the different lotteries (for one subject, the WTA of all lotteries ranged 
from $15 to $18, for another from $48 to $60 and for the third from $46 to $60). 
This behavior might indicate improper understanding of the task, for the reasons 
explained above. Moreover, six other subjects stated implausibly large WTA values 
(of at least $50 for each lottery) or wrote a WTA higher than the highest possible 142  AMEricAn EconoMic JournAL: MicroEconoMics  MAy 2012
prize. We believe that this might be caused by the tendency to behave “strategically,” 
asking for as much as possible in a bargaining situation. A few subjects also had 
inconsistent responses. We assigned a total of 16 subjects in Experiment 4 as having 
“questionable responses.”
We should note that in Session 4 of Experiment 4, one subject complained that 
some other subject/subjects had not written down the actual Excel random number, 
but a different one (by clicking “enter” multiple times). We should note that in this 
type of experiment, subjects might write a different anchor number than the one that 
they are instructed to write. If the anchor question is incentivized, then it is in the 
subjects’ best interest to write a number as large as possible in WTA experiments, 
and a number as low as possible in WTP experiments.
20 Excluding from the sample 
the eight subjects with anchor numbers higher than 80 in Session 4, we believe that 
we exclude the most suspicious observations. The possibility of cheating can never 
be ruled out, and excluding the suspicious observations leaves a very reasonable 
distribution of random numbers for all our experiments.
Characterizing observations as “questionable” or “suspicious” adds a necessar-
ily subjective, and perhaps arbitrary, element. However, we feel that it is useful to 
examine whether our results are driven by confusion or cheating. For doing this, we 
can see whether excluding these subjects significantly changes the results. Table 9 
describes the correlations between the anchor number and WTA/WTP for the sam-
ples where the questionable and suspicious observations are excluded: 15 observa-
tions from the data of Experiment 1, 11 observations from the data of Experiment 2, 
18 observations of Experiment 3, and 23 observations from the data of Experiment 4.
20 The mean of the anchor number that subjects wrote in Experiment 1 was 51.4, and the median 55. In 
Experiment 2, the mean was 49.7 and the median was equal to 53. In Experiment 3, the mean was 50.1 and the 
median 54. In Experiment 4, the mean was equal to 56.7 with a median equal to 60.
Table 9—Correlations for the Samples that Exclude Objectionable and Suspicious Observations
Experiment 1 
n = 64
Academic 
planner
Cordless 
keyboard
Financial 
calculator
Designer 
book
Milk 
chocolates
Cordless 
mouse
Pearson 0.033 −0.063 0.264 0.120 0.054 −0.137
p-value 0.40 >0.5 0.02 0.17 0.34 >0.5
Experiment 2 
n = 67
Class 
organizer
Cordless 
keyboard
Milk 
chocolates
Cordless 
mouse
Designer 
book
Financial 
calculator
Pearson −0.026 −0.030 −0.067 −0.055 −0.020 −0.018
p-value >0.5 >0.5 >0.5 >0.5 >0.5 >0.5
Experiment 3 
n = 61
Address 
book
Cordless 
keyboard
Milk 
chocolates
Cordless 
mouse
Designer 
book
Financial 
calculator
Pearson −0.001 −0.005 −0.022 0.164 −0.017 −0.090
p-value >0.5 >0.5 >0.5 >0.10 >0.5 >0.5
Experiment 4 
n = 85
0.5, $100; 
0.5, $0
0.25, $100; 
0.75, $0
0.1, $100; 
0.9, $0
0.75, $60; 
0.25, $20
0.5, $60; 
0.5, $20
0.9, $60; 
0.1, $20
Pearson 0.041 0.112 0.052 −0.047 −0.083 −0.123
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Table 9 reveals that the anchoring effects, measured as the Pearson correlations of 
the anchor with the stated valuation, are similar for the sample that excludes objec-
tionable and suspicious observations. Note that very similar results are obtained, in 
Experiment 4, if we exclude only the objectionable observations, but not the suspi-
cious ones, and vice versa. Therefore, the subjective element does not seem to affect 
the main results of our experiments.
Appendix 2: Instructions for the Lotteries Experiment (Experiment 4)
Welcome to CASSEL. Please turn off pagers and cellular phones now. It is impor-
tant that you do not talk, or with any other way try to communicate during the 
experiment. Thank you for participating in this pricing exercise. We are interested in 
how much you value various lotteries. We will show you six different lotteries, and 
then ask you a pair of price-selling intent questions about each lottery:
•	 First,	we	will	ask	whether	you	would	like	to	sell	the	lottery	at	a	particular	price.	
Your computer generated that price randomly.
•	 Next,	we	will	ask	you	to	state	the	minimum	that	you	would	be	willing	to	accept	
for selling the lottery.
Three persons will be chosen at random from the class and the decisions of each 
about one of the lotteries will be carried out for real money. One lottery will be sold 
on the basis of answers to the first question, and two lotteries on the basis of answers 
to the second question. Each person is on the running for only one lottery.
If you are chosen and the first question counts for you, then we will look to see 
whether you decided to sell, or not to sell, the lottery at your random computer-
generated price. If you stated that you wanted to sell the lottery at that price, then 
we will buy it from you at that price. If you stated that you did not want to sell the 
lottery at that price, you will keep it.
If you are chosen and the second question counts:
•	 The	price	of	the	lottery	will	be	determined	by	drawing	a	number	at	random	
from the matrix in the overhead slide.
•	 If	the	value	is	smaller	than	this	random	price,	then	the	lottery	will	be	sold	at that 
randomly selected price.
•	 If	the	value	stated	is	higher	than	the	price,	then	the	lottery	will	not	be	sold.
Because your answer does not affect the amount you get paid, only whether you sell, 
it’s to your advantage to state the minimum that you would be willing to be paid for 
selling the lottery.
Each of you will receive a $16 participation fee. In addition, if you are one of 
the three persons chosen, all results from lotteries you have chosen to keep will be 
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the results of a lottery you keep, will be added to your participation fee. You will 
know your total earnings when you leave the experiment.
First, please copy your computer-generated random number in each of the 6 boxes
LOTTERY TICKET 1
50% chance of 50% chance of
$ 100 $ 0
___________________________________________________________
Would you sell this lottery ticket for $□? Circle YES or NO
The least I would be willing to receive to sell this lottery is $ ________
LOTTERY TICKET 2
25% chance of 75% chance of
$ 100 $ 0
____________________________________________________________
Would you sell this lottery ticket for $□? Circle YES or NO
The least I would be willing to receive to sell this lottery is $ ________
LOTTERY TICKET 3
10% chance of 90% chance of
$ 100 $ 0
____________________________________________________________
Would you sell this lottery ticket for $□? Circle YES or NO
The least I would be willing to receive to sell this lottery is $ ________
LOTTERY TICKET 4
75% chance of 25% chance of
$ 60 $ 20
_____________________________________________________________
Would you sell this lottery ticket for $□? Circle YES or NO
The least I would be willing to receive to sell this lottery is $ ________
LOTTERY TICKET 5
50% chance of 50% chance of
$ 60 $ 20
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Would you sell this lottery ticket for $□? Circle YES or NO
The least I would be willing to receive to sell this lottery is $ ________
LOTTERY TICKET 6
90% chance of 10% chance of
$ 60 $ 20
___________________________________________________________
Would you sell this lottery ticket for $□? Circle YES or NO
The least I would be willing to receive to sell this lottery is $ _______
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